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The paper seeks to ¯ll the void in the empirical economics literature of
U.S. antimerger policy. A new empirical measure of relief secured in a Section
7 case is proposed. The extent of obtained relief is modeled as a fraction
of the competitive overlap subject to structural divestiture. The model of
determination of the relative size and scope of divestiture is applied to a sample
of recent Section 7 cases. The estimated model is reasonably successful at
predicting the outcomes of several out-of-sample cases.
1 Introduction
Section 7 of the Clayton Act of 1914 made it illegal for two competitors to merge if
such a merger would result in a signi¯cant restriction of competition. In 1950, the
Celler-Kefauver amendment closed a signi¯cant loophole in the existing antimerger
legislation by outlawing anticompetitive acquisitions of assets as well as acquisitions
of stock. The law empowering the antitrust authorities to challenge anticompetitive
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1mergers has been the same for over half a century now, although its interpretation
has evolved over the years, as the government and the courts gained experience from
handling various cases.
Identifying the \problem" cases out of numerous mergers taking place each year
eventually became a standardized process, as the Department of Justice issued its
¯rst Horizontal Merger Guidelines in 1968. These guidelines speci¯ed thresholds of
market concentration that, when exceeded, would likely trigger a more extensive
investigation of a merger. As economic theory became more dominant in the analysis
of antitrust cases, the Merger Guidelines were revised several times | in 1982, 1984,
1992, 1994, and 19971 | adding emphasis to such important factors as barriers to
entry, e±ciencies, and likelihood of collusion among competitors.
While the legal treatment of mergers improved steadily throughout the existence
of antimerger enforcement, the remedies, or \¯xes," carried out under Section 7 were
often ignored. Many researchers have pointed out that frequently the focus of merger
investigations was on establishing the anticompetitive potential of the transaction.
When such was found, the government can do no better than disallow the merger
entirely. However, if there are substantial e±ciencies foregone by prohibiting all
(arguably) anticompetitive mergers, then such policy begs for improvement. Also,
until the passage of the Hart-Scott-Rodino (HSR) Antitrust Improvements Act of
1976, the merger investigation typically did not commence until after the merger was
consummated. Therefore, \disallowing" the transaction really meant \dissolving" the
already-combined entities. This by itself can easily be seen to be problematic.
Resolving an anticompetitive situation arising out of a proposed merger became
easier once the HSR Act gave the government the power to delay the merger while
1The latest version of this document is available on the Department of Justice, Antitrust Division
website at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public.
2the investigation proceeds. Thus, dissolving potentially troublesome mergers after
they have been consummated is usually no longer necessary. However, antimerger
remedies only recently became the focal point of improvement of antimerger policy.
Studies of merger challenges of the 1950s and 1960s (Elzinga 1969 and Pfunder, Plaine
and Whittemore 1972) and 1970s (Rogowsky 1982) found that the relief obtained by
the government is unsuccessful in a great majority of cases. The problems identi¯ed
plagued both the instruments of relief used by the antitrust agencies (partial divesti-
tures, reliance on marketing or conduct orders, bans on further acquisitions, etc.)
and the enforcement of consent orders. In other words, remedies were often poorly
designed in the ¯rst place and hence doomed for failure; additionally, sometimes even
a well-structured solution would prove unsuccessful because its execution was not
properly monitored.
In recent decades, antimerger remedies have increasingly consisted of asset divesti-
tures. However, as is evident from numerous cases reviewed by Elzinga and Rogowsky,
as recently as in 1980s relief obtained by the antitrust authorities in many cases was
limited by the insistence of the agencies on relying on non-divestiture instruments,
such as marketing orders, which simply prohibit certain types of conduct. Neverthe-
less, today divestiture of overlap assets is the preferred method of relief sought by the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Department of Justice (DOJ).
2 Purpose of Study
It is worth pointing out that it is not the goal of this paper to evaluate the U.S.
merger policy as a whole or to make policy recommendations regarding such aspects
of it as legislation, interpretation of the law, dual-agency enforcement, or case se-
lection process. It is true, for example, that if the government tends to challenge
3some procompetitive mergers, then poor or no relief obtained in such cases may be
better than carrying out a successful remedy, which repairs a nonexistent | though,
perceived | injury to competition. For the purposes of the present study, we assume
(perhaps, naively) that the process of screening anticompetitive mergers is e±cient.
In other words, we consider only relief sought in cases deemed problematic according
to their anticompetitive potential, while ignoring any \Type I error" | challenging
too many harmless cases.
Section 7 relief continues to be problematic today. While the antitrust agencies
have committed to improving their approach and performance2, there is evidence of
inadequate remedies being used to address serious competitive issues related to recent
merger activity. For example, Coate and Kleit (2001), who review 113 of recent FTC
consent decrees, report that thirty-one of them were \compromise" or problematic
settlements. They identify six cases in which divestiture was inadequate to address
all of the likely competitive issues, and ¯ve cases with no structural remedy at all.
Clearly, a study of the underlying process would contribute to a deeper understanding
of the causes of such shortcomings and, ultimately, suggest a \diagnosis" that can be
used to devise a \cure" for the ailing system.
The e®ectiveness of antimerger relief has not been adequately addressed in the
empirical economics literature.3 Following the pioneering work by Elzinga (1969),
Pfunder, Plaine and Whittemore (1972) and Rogowsky (1982, 1986), little has been
done to assess the appropriateness of structural remedies. These papers reached
a common conclusion that relief obtained by the antitrust authorities in the vast
majority of Section 7 cases was unsuccessful.
2See Parker and Balto (2000) and Sche®man, Coate and Silvia (2002).
3It is also worth noting that all of the existing studies of Section 7 enforcement are done by
current or former sta® members of the FTC or the Justice Department. The present paper is, to
the author's knowledge, the ¯rst attempt to shed light on the mechanics of the antimerger review
process using only publicly available sources.
4Application of econometric techniques is also rather rare. The few studies that
exist aim to address some particular aspect of the merger policy. For example, stock
market event studies, popular in the 1980s and early 1990s, seek to explain the ab-
normal stock returns that accrue to ¯rms planning to merge as the ¯nancial markets
interpret the announcement of the acquisition as \e±ciency-enhancing" or \market-
power-creating."4 Several papers attempt to quantify the impact of premerger noti¯-
cation (under the HSR) on the agencies' decisions to challenge a particular merger.5
A large portion of the recent literature on merger policy deals with simulating the
e®ects of acquisitions on prices in various markets.6
This paper's main goal is threefold. First, it seeks to address the obvious void
in the literature on the economics of merger policy by examining the e®ectiveness
of remedies used in recent Section 7 cases. Second, it suggests and applies a new
empirical approach to measuring the degree of success achieved in a particular merger
challenge. Third, it demonstrates that a great deal of information potentially useful
to the ¯rms contemplating a merger can be gleaned from the data made public by
the antitrust authorities.
The present study focuses on cases reviewed by the Justice Department, mainly
because the Antitrust Division sta® are typically more forthcoming about disclosing
the details of their economic analysis than the Bureau of Economics at the FTC. How-
ever, a priori, there is no reason to expect that choosing only DOJ cases introduces
any sample selection bias: while mergers in some industries are frequently reviewed
4See, for example, Eckbo (1992), McGuckin, Warren-Boulton, and Waldstein (1992), Eckbo and
Weir (1985), Schumann (1983), and Stillman (1993).
5See Johnson and Parkman (1991) and Lopatka and Mongoven (1995).
6An exhaustive list of relevant papers is obviously too long to be reproduced here, but see, for
instance, Werden and Froeb (1994, 1996), Werden (1996), Crooke et al. (1999), Froeb and Tschantz
(2001), Jayaratne and Shapiro (2000), and Epstein and Rubinfeld (2001) for recent examples of
advances in merger simulations.
5by the same agency7, generally who handles the case is decided on a case-by-case
basis. Rogowsky (1982) discusses the bene¯ts and costs of dual-agency antimerger
enforcement and ¯nds that there are very subtle di®erences in the outcomes achieved
by the two agencies.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 3 brie°y discusses
the theoretical foundation; Section 4 presents the empirical approach; Section 5 dis-
cusses the sources and construction of the data; estimation techniques and results
are presented in Sections 6 and 7; Section 8 presents and discusses the results of
out-of-sample prediction, and Section 9 concludes.
3 Theoretical Background
A summary of antimerger activity at the Justice Department is presented in Table 1.
As is evident from the table, the vast majority of Section 7 cases are settled rather
than litigated. Consequently, the remedies implemented in such cases are results of
negotiations.
The process of determination of appropriate structural relief can be viewed as a
bargaining game between two players: the Firm proposing to merge with a competitor
and the Agency (government's antitrust authority). The proposed merger is assumed
to result in some potential for harm to competition in the overlap markets. The
bargaining game is a negotiation over the division of assets involved in this overlap:
any divestiture of assets obtained by the Agency resolves some of the anticompetitive
issues (a complete divestiture | i.e., elimination of overlap | would resolve such
issues completely), while the portion of assets retained by the Firm contributes to
7For instance, airline mergers are typically handled by the DOJ, while mergers of healthcare
providers and acquisitions of ¯rms producing equipment for the Department of Defense and the
military lie in the domain of the FTC.
6competitive injury.












1990 13 11 5 (45.5) 2 6
1991a 13 4 3 (75) 9 0
1992 7 4 4 (100) 3 0
1993 10 5 4 (80) 5 0
1994 22 10 7 (70) 14 1
1995 18 9 6 (66.7) 10 2
1996b 30 10 9 (90) 20 0
1997 31 14 13 (92.9) 17 1
1998 51 15 10 (66.7) 41 0
1999 47 21 20 (95.2) 26 1
2000 48 21 18 (85.7) 2 1
a One case was dismissed after the court denied a preliminary injunction.
b One transaction challenged by the DOJ was subsequently approved by a regulatory
agency.
Source: FTC Annual Reports to Congress pursuant to the HSR Act, FY 1990{2000.
The standard bargaining theory results8 suggest that the player with a relatively
lower cost of delay gets the larger share of the pie. In the following section, we
propose a new approach to empirically test whether such predictions are consistent
with the observed patterns of divestitures. Speci¯cally, the following question is
posed and answered: what (merger-speci¯c and other) factors a®ect the outcome of
the bargaining situation in each particular case?
4 Empirical Approach
The players' degrees of patience are not empirically observable. However, the magni-
tudes of these discount rates are not important, because the payo® to Agency depends
8See the classic paper by Rubinstein (1982).
7only on its cost of delay relative to that of the Firm, not on the absolute magnitudes
of these costs. A useful analogy is suggested by Muthoo (1999): in a boxing match,
the stronger of the two athletes wins while their absolute strengths are irrelevant.
The outcome of the negotiation is determined by the bargaining strength param-




where rA and rF are the Agency's and the Firm's discount rates, respectively. This
bargaining strength parameter is modeled here empirically as an unknown function
f(VA; VF) of the vectors VA and VF of exogenous factors a®ecting each player's
degree of patience. As discussed below, each vector is player-speci¯c in the sense
that Vi's components are determinants only of player i's cost of delay for i = A; F.
However, it is possible to interpret the impact of any individual variable as the net
e®ect on the outcome.
The cost of prolonged negotiation to the Agency is determined by several factors.
For example, Agency's cost of delay with respect to any particular case is expected
to be greater whenever it has a relatively heavy workload. In other words, one would
expect the Agency to accept more quick settlements | which tend to be weaker |
when it must deal with many pending matters at the same time.
Merger-speci¯c e±ciencies are also expected to increase the Agency's cost of delay,
making it more impatient. The more the society stands to bene¯t from a particular
merger, the greater is the cost of delaying it because of antitrust review. This assumes,
of course, that the Agency seeks to maximize consumer welfare and thus ¯nds it costly
to delay a welfare-enhancing merger. Such an assumption is consistent with modeling
the antitrust agencies as benevolent government authorities, which is the approach
used here, but is inconsistent with the results from public choice literature.9
9The public choice theory of antitrust enforcement, which gained popularity in the 1970s, views
8The antitrust agencies are not immune to political pressure from the legislative
and/or the executive branches. To the extent that there are partisan ideological
di®erences in the approach to merger policy among in°uential political ¯gures, the
Agency is likely to be a®ected by the current regime's attitude to antitrust actions.
Coate, Kleit and Bustamante (1995) suggested that a heavily Democratic congress
could expect the antitrust agencies to challenge and litigate more cases, while a more
Republican congress would prefer settlements. On the other hand, the Republican-
dominated congress may insist on litigation so as to avoid allowing the antitrust
agency to assume the role of an uno±cial regulator, whereas Democrats would opt
for some type of settlement. The overall e®ect on either case selection or outcomes
is uncertain; consequently, the impact on the Agency's degree of patience in dealing
with only settled cases is also ambiguous. One possibility is that demanding successful
litigation in the majority of cases diverts the Agency's and Congress' attention away
from the few remaining settlements, where the Agency is highly impatient.
The severity of anticompetitive concerns associated with the proposed merger is
likely to a®ect the degree of patience of the Agency. An acquisition that would tend to
cause substantial competitive harm if not properly remedied will increase the return
to prolonged bargaining for the Agency; hence its cost of delay will be lower.
Finally, a merger that receives a lot of exposure in the media puts additional
pressure on the Agency to bring the case to resolution quickly. Several factors may
contribute to how well any particular acquisition is covered by the media. For in-
stance, a merger that promises huge consumer savings through the realization of
the agencies' sta®s (attorneys) as individual utility maximizers. Rather than pursue the intended
objectives of preserving competition and enforcing the antitrust laws, the lawyers often see public
service as a stepping stone towards more lucrative careers in private practice. Therefore, they tend
to seek to maximize the visible \output" of their agency by, for instance, bringing as many easily
winnable cases as possible. See, for example, Rogowsky (1986, 1987); MacKay, Miller and Yandle
(1987) is a good collection of papers on public choice.
9some merger-related synergies is likely to be publicized to a great extent. On the
other hand, a merger that is likely to lead to consumer harm due to substantial mar-
ket power achieved by the Firm is likely to generate a public outcry and hence be
covered thoroughly as well. Also, mergers in markets for consumer goods typically
receive more media exposure.
On the Firm's side of negottiations, the \hostage" e®ect is present in a settlement
whenever the entire proposed acquisition is held up by the Agency's review of poten-
tial anticompetitive problems in one or more of the relevant markets. The larger the
uncontested portion of the merger relative to the portion under review, the greater
is the \hostage" e®ect, and hence the greater is the cost to the Firm of prolonged
negotiations.
The anticompetitive potential of the merger also in°uences the cost to the Firm of
delaying the settlement. Firm may be more patient in its dealings with the Agency if
it is con¯dent that it is going to bene¯t quite a bit from a great deal of market power
obtained through the acquisition. If so, it pays to wait because a smaller divestiture
is likely to not diminish Firm's additional market power by very much.
An important aspect of negotiations with the Agency arises out of dynamic consid-
erations of repeated contacts between the Firm and the antitrust authorities. While
in this model, the players are assumed to bargain over the speci¯cs of an individual
case, in reality it is likely that ¯rms who have frequent interactions with the govern-
ment tend to consider the \reputation" e®ect of resisting the authorities. If so, then
larger ¯rms, who deal with the government often, may not be the toughest hagglers,
but be willing to compromise quickly.
On the other hand, it is possible that Firm size is positively related to its ability
to bargain and delay accepting an o®er. If the \reputation" e®ect is not important to
the Firm, then one would expect larger ¯rms to act more patiently in dealings with
10the authorities because of their ability to ¯nance such lengthy negotiations. This
\war chest" e®ect characteristic of large ¯rms was ¯rst investigated by McCall (1984)
in his study of the applicability of a rule of reason to predatory pricing.
Finally, a higher anticipated cost of completing any divestiture is likely to increase
the degree of patience of the Firm. Theoretically, the more costly it is to comply with
a consent decree requiring a divestiture of a given size, the more willing the Firm will
be to wait in the hopes of striking a better deal, ceteris paribus. It has been suggested
by previous research10 that retail properties are much more di±cult to sell than other
assets (plants, manufacturing equipment, etc.) because of the need to ensure that
economies of distribution are not lost when outlets are sold to di®erent buyers. If this
stipulation is valid, then certain ¯rms, such as owners of grocery chains, will have
lower costs of delay than other ¯rms.
To summarize, the vectors of factors determining the cost of delay to each player
can be written as follows:
VA =fMerger-speci¯c e±ciencies, current workload of the agency, political
pressure, merger's public exposure, anticompetitive potential of the mergerg
VF =f\Hostage" factor, anticompetitive potential of the merger, \reputation"
e®ect, anticipated cost of complying with a divestiture orderg
Note that with the exception of the anticompetitive potential of the merger, the com-
ponents of vectors VA and VF appear in one vector or the other, but not both. This
modeling assumption greatly simpli¯es the interpretation of estimated coe±cients on
the variables proxying the impact of each factor on the outcome of negotiations.
10See, for example, Coate and Kleit (2001).
115 Construction of the Data
The sample is drawn from the universe of 99 Section 7 cases settled by the Antitrust
Division of the DOJ between 1990 and 2000, as reported in the Annual Reports to
Congress pursuant to the HSR Act.11 After eliminating the cases involving joint
ventures, and those for which reliable data could not be located, there are 73 usable
observations. An observation in this instance is a settlement between the parties
on the one hand and the DOJ on the other, which is fewer than the number of
transactions reviewed.12 For each case, the relevant information was taken from the
texts of the Formal Complaint, the Proposed Final Judgment, and the Competitive
Impact Statement ¯led by the sta® of the Antitrust Division.13 Where additional
information was required, other sources, such as industry periodicals and company
¯nancial statements were consulted. It is worthwhile to note that all information
used is publicly available to any researcher for replication.14
Before discussing the construction of individual variables, it is useful to de¯ne the
competitive overlap empirically, especially since this concept is quite central to the
analysis presented here. Coate (1992, 1995) suggests using sales of the acquired ¯rm
in the relevant market as a measure for the size of the overlap. However, occasionally
the target's sales are signi¯cantly larger than those of the acquiring company in a
particular market, so consistently using acquired ¯rm's sales would overstate the
overlap for these mergers. Therefore, the overlap is taken to be equal to the sales of
11Note that the reports do not necessarily list only (or all of) the cases initiated under the HSR
premerger noti¯cation system. Identi¯cation of these cases would potentially compromise the con-
¯dentiality used to collect the proprietary information from the parties.
12Several cases dealt with asset swaps or multiple transactions (sometimes involving three or more
¯rms.)
13The list of cases is available form the author upon request as Appendix A.
14A potential drawback in relying on the public record produced by the DOJ is due to the fact
that the documents, such as the Competitive Impact Statement, are produced after the settlement is
reached. Therefore, the Antitrust Division sta® have an incentive to present the factual information
in a manner that is convincing that the consent decree resolves all of the competitive issues.
12the ¯rm with a smaller presence in the relevant market.
The dependent variable, D, equals the fraction of the competitive overlap subject
to divestiture. It is calculated as the ratio of sales generated by the assets to be
divested to sales from total overlap assets. Note that, by de¯nition, 0 · D · 1. In
a number of cases, the settlement called for a divestiture of assets, revenues from
which exceeded those initially determined to be subject to review (i.e., in overlap).
In the context of the present model, such divestitures would imply D > 1: However,
since this is obviously inconsistent with the bargaining framework employed here | it
means that the Agency is able to obtain a portion of the cake larger than the amount
bargained over | the dependent variable is set to equal one for these cases. As a
result, D is \censored" in the following sense: an observed value of D = 1 implies
D¤ ¸ 1, where D¤ is the \unobserved" true measure of the divestiture's impact, and
is interpreted as full structural relief obtained.15
The variable VALUE is assigned the value of the proposed transaction, in millions
of dollars. Where a foreign acquirer is involved, and the value of the merger is reported
in a di®erent currency, the o±cial exchange rate for the date of the proposed merger
is used. Additionally, in one case involving a stock swap, the price of a share on
the date of the merger announcement is used to estimate the corresponding asset
purchase price. The values are de°ated using the GDP de°ator to 1996.
The total annual revenues of the acquiring ¯rm are recorded in SALES, also
de°ated to 1996. This variable measures the relative size of the acquirers, potentially
capturing the \reputation" e®ect described above.
In addition, examination of the Department of Justice complaints and competitive
impact statements yielded information on the following variables:
15The use of quotation marks in this sentence indicates that the resulting econometric model
resembles a censored regression model, which would be appropriate if D¤ were truly unobservable.
13CONSUMER = dummy; equals 1 if the merger involves a consumer product;
USA = dummy; equals 1 if the acquiring ¯rm is a US entity;
RETAIL = dummy; equals 1 if the potential divestiture would involve selling
retail units (e.g., grocery stores or movie theaters);
HHI = Her¯ndahl Index (after merger, assuming no divestiture) for each rele-
vant market a®ected by merger;
BARRIER = dummy; equals 1 if the Complaint or the Competitive Impact
Statement contained signi¯cant evidence of di±cult, unlikely, untimely, or in-
su±cient entry;
COLLUDE = dummy; equals 1 if the Complaint or the Competitive Impact
Statement alluded to a high probability of coordinated action among ¯rms
(collusion.)
While collusion is typically only discussed in those cases where both the likelihood of
coordination is high and the corresponding loss in competition would be substantial,
barriers to entry are claimed to be present and signi¯cant in every case. Intuitively,
this is not surprising, since, according to the theory of contestable markets, without
di±cult entry, ¯rms in even highly concentrated markets should behave competi-
tively as the threat of potential entry forces prices down. Nevertheless, only where
time-consuming or unlikely entry is supported by concrete evidence, the variable
BARRIER is assigned a value of 1; whenever no support is provided, the barriers
are assumed to be insigni¯cant. Out of 73 cases, in 56 instances entry barriers are
demonstrated to be substantial.
The documents also provided information on the dates of the merger, the com-
plaint, and the entry of the Final Judgment; total sales of the acquired entity and
14sales of the acquired entity involved in competitive overlap. The ratio of the acquired
¯rm's sales in overlap to its total sales de¯nes the fraction of the merger subject to
antitrust review.16
The variable HOSTAGE is equal to one minus the portion of the acquisition under
review; therefore, it measures the fraction of the deal held up by the investigation.
This variable is similar to the measure SETLLE VALUE used by Coate, Kleit and
Bustamante (1995) and Coate and Kleit (2001) to investigate the parties' incentives
to ¯ght the FTC, fold (abandon the merger) or settle.
The following additional explanatory variables were either constructed from the
information above or obtained from other sources:
EFFICNCY = proxy for merger-related e±ciencies that would potentially ac-
crue to the acquiring ¯rm; equals VALUE times the fraction of the deal under
review.
The rationale for using this particular measure is as follows: a large overlap is likely
to translate into substantial synergies realized by the acquirer as some of the ac-
quired assets that duplicate the ¯rm's own operations are shutdown, scrapped, or
sold o®. More precisely, the importance of merger-related e±ciencies depends on the
size of the overlap relative to other mergers as well as on the absolute size of the
transaction; therefore, VALUE£(1¡HOSTAGE) captures both aspects of this rela-
tionship.17 Note that given the construction of EFFICNCY, Agency, assumed to seek
16In several cases the information on target's sales in a particular geographic market was unavail-
able. Then, the \fraction under review" is approximated by the ratio of the number of target's
facilities (plants) in a®ected markets to the total number of its facilities.
17Other proxies for merger-speci¯c e±ciencies found in the literature include the number of pages
in the FTC Bureau of Economics memoranda devoted to the explanation of proposed cost-savings
(Coate, Kleit and Bustamante 1995) and the number of FTC docket entries per case (Rogowsky
1986). Both measures are somewhat less direct and require access to the agency's restricted internal
documents. Furthermore, the former measure may to some extent re°ect the degree of disagreement
between the parties about the scope of potential synergies rather than the substance of the savings
themselves.
15to maximize consumer welfare, is \penalized" for substantial divestitures, which tend
to eliminate a large portion of overlap. In other words, merger-speci¯c e±ciencies
directly a®ect Agency's payo®.
WORK = measure of the workload at the DOJ at the time of each case; equals
the total number of transactions reported to the Antitrust Division in the month
when complaint is ¯led;
CONGRESS = share of Democrats in the House of Representatives;
SENATE = share of Democrats in the Senate;
POLITICS = (unweighted) average of CONGRESS and SENATE.
The preceding three variables proxy the extent of political pressure on the antitrust
authorities stemming from the partisan di®erences in the approach to antimerger
policy.
WSJ = number of articles published in The Wall Street Journal dealing with
the merger;
COURT% = the estimated probability that the merger will be enjoined, if
litigated.
The probability of government's victory in court is simulated using the estimates
form the econometric model described and estimated in Coate (1995) and used in
Coate and Kleit (2001).18
STRUCTURE = BARRIER£HHI/10000.
18Details of this simulation are available from the author as Appendix B upon request.
16This is an additional measure of the likely anticompetitive e®ect of the merger.19
TIME = number of months since the ¯rst case in the sample.
Given that the sample cases span a period of about eleven years, this variable is in-
cluded to account for any time-dependent changes in the design of divestiture reme-
dies.
Descriptive statistics of the variables discussed above are shown in Table 2.
6 Econometric Model
Since the dependent variable D is censored at both tails, zero and one, use of Ordinary
Least Squares (OLS) would lead to inconsistent estimates. In other words, we seek to
explain the variation in the unobserved dependent variable D¤ by using its censored





0 if D¤ · 0
D¤ if D¤ 2 (0; 1)
1 if D¤ ¸ 1
(1)
The frequency of each instance of D is shown in Table 3. The relevant regression
equations are estimated using the tobit model. The expected e®ects of explanatory
variables on the relative size of divestiture can be derived from the discussion of the
factors likely to a®ect the players' costs of delay.
19Where the case involved more than one (geographic and/or product) market, the maximum
value of HHI was used for these computations. An unweighted average as well as a weighted average
of the various markets' Her¯ndahls were also attempted, with the weights equal to the shares of each
particular market in the total overlap (measured by combined acquirer and target sales.) Neither
of the averages proved to result in signi¯cant COURT% or STRUCTURE variables.
17Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
D 0:6251 0:3661 0 1
VALUEa 6:2786 2:3359 2:0148 10:9651
EFFICNCYa, b 4:5868 1:9285 0 9:9075
CONSUMER 0:3425 0:4778 0 1
WORKc 3:229 1:0545 0:97 4:94
CONGRESS 0:5056 0:0532 0:4690 0:6138
SENATE 0:4869 0:0464 0:45 0:57
POLITICS 0:4962 0:0473 0:4618 0:5869
WSJ 5:9863 9:2429 0 47
HOSTAGE 0:6658 0:3142 0 1
SALESa 7:3833 2:074 2:7661 11:4076
USA 0:8904 0:3145 0 1
RETAIL 0:0959 0:2965 0 1
COURT% 0:782 0:354 0:00002 1
STRUCTURE 0:4194 0:3056 0 1
TIME 94:8342 38:3986 0 143:4
N = 73.
a Natural logs of actual values.
b By construction, EFFICNCY = ln(VALUE £(1¡HOSTAGE)) resulted
in several negative values, which were replaced by zeros.
c WORK is reported as hundreds of transactions per month.
Table 3: Frequency of the Observed Dependent Variable
Value Frequency Percent
D = 0 7 9:6
0 < D < 1 37 50:7
D = 1 29 39:7
Total 73 100:0
For example, a consumer welfare-enhancing merger (i.e., one with a relatively high
realization of EFFICNCY) puts pressure on the Agency to minimize the delay and
resolve the case quickly; therefore, its coe±cient is expected to be negative. The co-
e±cient signs on the political variables (CONGRESS, SENATE, and POLITICS) are
18undetermined a priori. Similarly, the e®ect of acquiring ¯rm's relative size, measured
here by SALES, is ambiguous based on the theoretical arguments. Additionally, USA
is included to investigate whether foreign acquirers systematically achieve di®erent
outcomes from their domestic counterparts due to di®erence in their bargaining costs;
a priori, no expectations are formed for this coe±cient. The expected signs of the
coe±cients on all variables are summarized in Table 4.



















Several underlying models can be posited and estimated depending on what one
considers to be the major driving force behind the bargaining process. Results of
estimation are presented in Table 5 below. Model 1, for example, is a \Chicago-plus-
19E±ciencies" model similar to a model suggested and estimated in Coate (2000).20
According to the Chicago school of thought, conduct and performance of the industry
are directly determined by its structure | i.e., market concentration, ease of entry
and collusive behavior. Therefore, a merger presenting a great deal of competitive
concern is deemed undesirable and must be remedied adequately. The scope of the
divestiture is assumed to be determined primarily by the anticompetitive potential of
the merger, but merger-speci¯c e±ciencies are included to o®set the harmful e®ect on
competition. Formally, the degree of patience of the Agency is a®ected most of all by
how competitively harmful a particular merger is likely to be. The model performs
poorly as only the constant coe±cient is statistically signi¯cant.
Next, we estimate a model, in which political forces play a central role in deter-
mining the outcome of negotiations. One might think of this model (Model 2) as
arising out of the public choice theories of antitrust, according to which the Agency
tends to maximize its bureaucratic output, while being in°uenced from the outside by
political pressures. While this model appears to perform slightly better than Model
1, all of the explanatory power rests with WSJ. The results suggest that while a
high-pro¯le case's degree of public exposure in the media a®ects the outcome of the
settlements, outside in°uences, such as Congress' supervision of the antitrust agen-
cies, are not important. Note that the coe±cient on WSJ is of the wrong sign | it
is expected to be negative, a priori | but interpretation of individual coe±cients is
hardly appropriate in this context, as the modeling assumptions clearly do not stand
up to empirical testing.
Model 3 posits a particular relationship between the Firm and the Agency, in
20In that study, the likelihood of an FTC challenge is investigated given the characteristics of a
proposed acquisition. Although an entirely di®erent issue is being addressed here, one would expect
that the probability of a challenge and extent of structural relief obtained in any case are a®ected
by similar factors.
20which the Firm-speci¯c and merger-speci¯c characteristics are central to the bargain-
ing process, while Agency's approach is the same to all cases. This assumption may
be plausible if in a typical case, Agency allows Firm to make whatever concessions
the latter deems worthwhile in order to get the approval for its acquisition. In such a
case, the Firm-side factors are important, while the variation in Agency's character-
istics across di®erent mergers matters relatively little. The results indicate that the
portion of the deal not subject to antitrust review but held up by the investigation
(measured by HOSTAGE) explains all of the variation in the dependent variable. In
other words, the only factor a®ecting Firm's cost of delay substantially arises from
the inability to consummate the entire merger. Note the (statistical) insigni¯cance
of COURT% and COURT%2, pointing to the fact that ¯rms proposing mergers mo-
tivated by the pursuit of greater market power are just as patient in their dealings
with the government as are ¯rms pursuing other objectives through acquisition.21
Model 4 is a \Consumer Welfare" model. It is estimated here to investigate
whether the goal of protecting or maximizing consumer welfare (as opposed to, for
example, total welfare) forces the Agency to be more patient in remedying the merg-
ers, which are likely to bring the most consumer harm if not ¯xed. None of the
included variables' coe±cients are signi¯cant, so this modeling scenario does not ap-
pear plausible.
The relatively poor performance of the four \restricted" models discussed so far
suggests that a combination of factors is at play. Therefore, a full or \Econometric"
model is estimated (Model 5), allowing for various Agency- and Firm-side character-
21There is some anecdotal support for this type of model. The rules of premerger noti¯cation grant
a good deal of strategic power to the Firm, who can essentially choose when to \start the clock"
on the review process. The antitrust agencies have no control over when the ¯ling is submitted to
them, but are limited to a 30-day waiting period, in which to make a decision whether to pursue
a challenge. In other words, the Agency's approach is likely to be the same to the review of most
proposed mergers, at least initially.
21istics to contribute to explaining the underlying process.
The last column of Table 5 presents the estimates from this model; the marginal
e®ects of explanatory variables22 are also given for each model.23
Nine out of thirteen coe±cients are statistically signi¯cant at conventional levels.24
The variable of interest, HOSTAGE, is signi¯cant and positive, as predicted by theory.
Note that the coe±cient falls in magnitude when additional regressors are included,
as is evident from a comparison of results from Model 5 with those from Model 3.
The EFFICNCY measure is also highly signi¯cant as is WSJ, although WSJ still has
the wrong sign. It may be that a great deal of media exposure increases the pressure
on the agency to \get it right" thus making it more patient. If this is a correct
conjecture, then WSJ will have a positive e®ect on the outcome.
The coe±cient on CONGRESS is signi¯cant and negative, suggesting that a larger
share of democrats is associated with less successful antimerger policy. The somewhat
puzzling result is the unexpected sign on the WORK proxy: it is positive, although
just barely statistically signi¯cant. It is possible that the e®ect of high workload
at the DOJ is misspeci¯ed in this model. For example, if during merger waves, the
government is forced to challenge a smaller proportion of mergers, it may be limited to
bringing only the strongest cases, which are easier to resolve with a strong settlement.
22Whenever a variable's coe±cient is not signi¯cantly di®erent from zero, the marginal e®ect is
omitted.
23A series of diagnostic tests was performed to assess the robustness of the estimated results,
including moment-based tests for the presence of multiplicative heteroskedasticity and for the validity
of the normality assumption on the error term. Details are available upon request from the author
as Appendix C.
24Coate (2000) attempts several models in his study of FTC decisions and also concludes that













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































24Also, focusing on only settled cases may inadvertently introduce a degree of selection
bias into the analysis: it is possible that relief obtained in all merger cases (including
those litigated) su®ers considerably, but settled cases fare better on average. On the
other hand, given the overwhelming prevalence of settlements among all Section 7
cases, this scenario is not likely.
The insigni¯cance of the coe±cients on SALES and on the dummy variables CON-
SUMER, USA, and RETAIL suggests that bigger ¯rms, domestic producers, makers
of consumer products, and retail chains do not on average receive any special treat-
ment. Finally, the anticompetitive potential measure, COURT% and its squared
form, COURT%2, are both signi¯cant and have opposite signs.
The e®ects on the unobserved dependent variable of a one standard deviation
change in each x can be computed using the information from the descriptive statis-
tics.25 Table 6 summarizes these results. The conditional mean of D, as reported by
Limdep, is 0.3645 and is computed as
E[Djxi] = 0 ¢ Prob[D = 0] + 1 ¢ Prob[D = 1]
+ E[Dj0 < D < 1] ¢ Prob[0 < D < 1]
25The need for the marginal e®ects arises from the di±culty in interpreting the raw tobit coef-
¯cients. Because of the censoring in the dependent variable, the obtained ^ ¯'s do not have valid
intuitive meaning. The corresponding marginal e®ects are computed as partial derivatives of the ex-
pected value (conditional mean) of the observed dependent variable with respect to the independent
variables, and equal the estimated coe±cients scaled by the probability of nonlimit observations in
the sample. That is,
@E[Djxi]=@x = ¯ £ Prob[0 < D < 1]
The derivatives are evaluated at the means of the explanatory variables. Since the marginal e®ects
are essentially the tobit coe±cients scaled down by a probability, they are smaller in magnitude
than the raw coe±cients.
25Table 6: Marginal Impacts (MI) on ~ D of Signi¯cant Variables
Variable Mean Std. Dev. (¾x) MI on ~ D of ¾x
EFFICNCY 4:5868 1:9285 ¡0:16913
WORK 3:229 1:0545 0:109563
CONGRESS 0:5056 0:0532 ¡0:13118
WSJ 5:9863 9:2429 0:479707
HOSTAGE 0:6658 0:3142 0:075659
COURT% 0:782 0:354 ¡0:52916
COURT%2 0:7351 0:3793a 0:54642a
TIME 94:8342 38:3986 ¡0:14975
a The standard deviation and marginal impact for COURT%2
are computed and reported for consistency purposes only. The
change in COURT%2 induced by a one-standard-deviation
change in COURT% is, of course, the more relevant measure.
Therefore, for example, an increase in the workload of the DOJ of about 105 transac-
tions per month (corresponding to a one-¾x increase) from the mean of 323 reported
mergers is associated with an increase in the size of divestiture of 0.1096 (from 0.3645
to 0.4741.) Similarly, an increase in the percentage of the deal held hostage to the
review from 66 percent to 98 percent, increases the fraction of overlap subject to
divestiture by roughly 0.076, from 0.3645 to 0.4402.
Somewhat less straightforward is the interpretation of the e®ect of a change in
COURT% since the variable enters the index function both linearly and quadratically,
and the coe±cients have opposite signs. A decrease in the probability of a govern-
mental victory in court from .782 to .428 (a one-sigma drop) has an overall e®ect of
reducing the divested fraction of overlap by 0.0879. Thus, on average, a merger with
about a 35 percent lower probability of being enjoined is subject to only a 9 percent
smaller divestiture.26
In summary, EFFICNCY27, WORK, CONGRESS, and WSJ have quantitatively
26Details of this computation are available from the author upon request as Appendix D.
27A one standard deviation rise in EFFICNCY corresponds to an increase in merger-speci¯c
e±ciencies from roughly $98.2 million to $675.4 million. However, given the construction of this
measure, these results should be interpreted with caution.
26meaningful e®ects on the size of the resulting divestiture, although a one-¾x change in
WSJ required for the above computation (about 9.2 articles) is rather large relative
to the mean of less than 6. The e®ects of HOSTAGE and the probability of a court
blocking the merger, on the other hand, are not substantial.
8 Out-of-Sample Prediction
Information on seven additional cases, all settled by the Antitrust Division in 2001,
was gathered.28 Below, one case is discussed in detail so as to give the reader an
idea of what a typical observation looks like. The results of prediction of all seven
out-of-sample cases are presented in Table 7 following this discussion. As is evident
from the reported results, ¯ve of the seven cases are predicted reasonably well by
the model. The two remaining mergers yielding rather inaccurate predictions are
analyzed below.
The Premdor/Int'l Paper/Masonite case dealt with the merger of a Canadian
maker of interior molded doors | Premdor, Inc. (Premdor) | and a maker of
molded doorskins (an input into the production of molded doors) | Masonite Cor-
poration (Masonite). Masonite was the only ¯rm in the molded doorskin business
that was not vertically integrated into the manufacture of molded doors; Premdor,
on the other hand, was one of Masonite's key competitors as well as a substantial
customer.29 Approximately 23 percent of Premdor's total sales in 2000 were revenues
28There were eight consent decrees during the 2001 ¯scal year. However, the Thomson-Harcourt
merger involving Thomson's acquisition from Reed Elsevier of Harcourt textbook publishing assets,
was excluded due to lack of reliable data. The case alleged potential competitive problems in markets
for thirty-eight college course textbooks as well as the market for computer-based testing services.
Given the data requirements for computations of the overlap and divestiture measures, the potential
for imprecise results is obvious in this case. The full list of cases used in this out-of-sample prediction
test is available from the author upon request as Appendix E.
29This case is an example of an occasional horizontal merger challenged by the government on
largely non-horizontal grounds in addition to the usual loss-of-competition concerns.
27from sales of interior molded doors, and Premdor also held a 48.5 percent interest in
a Chilean producer of molded doorskins, Fibramold. Masonite's total sales in 2000
were $465 million with about half of this amount accounted for by revenues from
molded doorskins.
The proposed merger between Premdor and Masonite, valued at $527 million, was
announced on September 30, 2000.30 The relevant antitrust markets were determined
as follows: for interior molded doorskins, the United States was deemed the appro-
priate geographic market, while for molded doors the geographic market was argued
to be comprised of small regional areas, each with a radius of about 300 miles and
centered at the point of manufacture.
The vertical integration of the ¯rms-parties to the merger presented additional
complicating aspects. The upstream and downstream product markets are closely
connected because the interior molded doorskins are a key input in the production
of interior molded doors and account for about 70 percent of the production cost.
The proposed merger would enhance substantially Premdor's otherwise small pres-
ence in the molded doorskins market and not (directly) a®ect the structure of the
molded doors market. However, elimination of an independent producer of molded
doorskins (Masonite) may lead to increased incentives for Premdor to foreclose other
non-vertically integrated ¯rms from the molded doorskins market; it would also make
coordinated action with the only other signi¯cant competitor (a ¯rm, not party to
the merger) easier and more likely. In other words, the downstream molded doors
market, while not a®ected directly, contributed several signi¯cant elements to the
analysis of the potential anticompetitive problems, such as likely coordinated action.
Given the resulting HHI measure for the upstream and downstream markets of
30See Katz (2002) for a more detailed discussion of this case.
284200 and 3600, respectively31, evidence of past collusive attempts in the industry,
and signi¯cant sunk costs required to initiate entry, the estimated probability of the
court enjoining the merger is .99973.
The settlement negotiation resulted in a consent decree requiring the divestiture
of one of the two production facilities, owned by Masonite. Since no information
was available on the production distribution across the two plants, located in Laurel,
MS and Towanda, PA, they were assumed to have equal capacity, and consequently
D = 0:5. The model predicted a divestiture of about 0.52, which is very close to the
observed outcome of one-half.




3D Systems/DTM 0:24329 0
AB Volvo/Renault/Mack Trucks 0:66193 1
Georgia-Paci¯c/Fort James 0:75177 1
Premdor/Int'l Paper/Masonite 0:51941 0:5
News Corp/Fox/Chris-Chraft 0:42851 1
Signature Flight Support/ Ranger 0:90289 1
WorldCom/Intermedia 0:28107 0:93118
The predicted outcomes discussed here should be interpreted with caution. Given
the approximations needed to construct some of the relevant measures, the results
should not be expected to be precise. Also, the validity of using estimates from a
prior period to predict later out-of-sample observations will be compromised if the
approach to the settlement process is markedly di®erent in 2001 from to that of the
previous years.32
31Again, the downstream market (interior molded doors) was not a®ected structurally, so pre-
and post-merger HHIs are the same.
32While there is no speci¯c reason to suspect that this is the case, two aspects are worthy of
29If one considers predictions of less than 0.5 reasonably good approximations of
observed outcomes in the interval [0; 0:5), and predictions of 0.5 or greater reasonable
estimates of outcomes in [0:5; 1], then only two cases are poorly predicted. Further-
more, if one breaks the [0; 1] interval into quartiles, and requires a \good" prediction
to be in the same quartile as the actual observed outcome, then three cases are
incorrectly predicted.
The case involving a merger of Worldcom with Intermedia Communications was
settled by a consent decree requiring a nearly complete divestiture of all assets ac-
quired by Worldcom as part of the merger. The overlap subject to review by the
DOJ constituted the entire merger, thus resulting in no signi¯cant hostage e®ect.
Therefore, according to the model developed here, the acquiring ¯rm should possess
substantial bargaining power as most of the deal is being challenged. The model
predicts a relatively small divestiture of about 28 percent of the overlap, while the
Justice Department achieved a nearly 93 percent divestiture.
The problem may lie in the regulatory framework, under which the merger was
proposed. Both Wordlcom and Intermedia are providers of various telecommunica-
tions services, including Internet backbone connectivity. In order to take control of
Intermedia's Internet Backbone Provider (IBP) operations, Worldcom ¯led an ap-
plication for the transfer of various licenses issued by the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) to Intermedia. Unless and until the FCC granted the transfer,
the merger could not be consummated, which essentially amounts to review of the
note. First, the methods of merger review and analysis are constantly evolving; therefore, if this
evolution process is not \smooth" but rather is characterized by bursts of innovation, predicting
future cases can lead to poor results. Second, in 2001, the Justice Department and the FTC raised
the threshold requirements for reporting a merger under the HSR, which immediately resulted in
fewer transactions ¯led and fewer low-pro¯le mergers reviewed. \Low-pro¯le" here refers to size-of-
transaction and size-of-person tests, which are re°ected in the value of the deal and sales of the ¯rms
involved. Any such merger may still be well covered in the media and be of considerable interest to
various groups.
30merger by a regulatory agency in addition to the challenge by the DOJ on antitrust
grounds. This additional source of delay is not accounted for by the model.
The other settlement that appeared problematic for the model is in the case
of a merger of two operators of television stations. News Corporation proposed to
acquire 10 stations owned by Chris-Craft, including KTVX-TV, a Salt Lake City
ABC a±liate. News had its own station, KSTU-TV in the same market, which it
operated through its subsidiary, FOX. The hostage e®ect associated with the delay
due to antitrust review was a substantial 0.9 since only one of the 10 stations was
located in the overlap. One would expect the acquiring ¯rm to be facing signi¯cant
costs from delaying the consummation of the merger and thus be willing to settle
quickly. In other words, a relatively high predicted value of D is expected. However,
the model yields a prediction of less than 0.43.
Upon closer examination, the structural characteristics of the relevant market
barely warrant issuing a challenge. Although the premerger HHI of about 2000 and
change of 785 points associated with the merger are both above the Justice Depart-
ment Guidelines' thresholds, this case can be argued to carry only a marginal potential
for competitive harm.33 The combined ¯rm would hold a 40 percent market share,
which even in the presence of entry barriers | argued to be substantial in this case |
seems less than threatening. Two additional TV stations would continue to compete
with the combined ¯rm for the spot advertising revenue. The estimated probability
of defeat in court is about .63 (the sample mean is .78.) Therefore, it is not surprising
that the model produces a relatively modest prediction for a case that is unlikely to
raise signi¯cant competitive concerns.
The mixed results of these out-of-sample prediction exercises suggest that the
estimated model should only be used as a rough benchmark in attempting to forecast
33The average post-merger HHI for the sample cases is 4569.
31what a divestiture ought to look like in any particular settlement. Given that an
individual case may di®er substantially from the \mean" Section 7 challenge, those
di®erences should be considered as well.
9 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we hope to address the obvious void in the empirical literature of the
economics of merger policy. While many aspects of the policy continue to be the
subject of research, structural remedies are often ignored. This paper demonstrates
that application of econometric techniques can help isolate the e®ects of various
exogenous in°uences on the underlying process. We hope that this study is a ¯rst,
albeit small, step in the right direction.
A variety of extensions to the presented framework are possible. We limit ourselves
to one suggestion here: application of the predictive ability of this divestiture model
to non-settled cases. What would a settlement look like if the parties reached an
agreement instead of insisting on litigation? Potentially, such study could reveal
whether, on balance, the merging ¯rms would have been better o® agreeing to the
predicted divestiture rather than incurring signi¯cant litigation costs and facing the
possibility of defeat in court.
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43B Simulation of COURT%
Using the data on FTC's Section 7 cases from the 1980s and early 1990s, Coate (1995)
estimates the following model:
COURT% = F(¡6:2 + 1:97COLLUDE + 4:26BARRIER + 0:000816HHI)
where F() is the cumulative normal distribution, the variables are de¯ned as above,
and all coe±cients are statistically signi¯cant. Admittedly a very crude estimate, the
probability of the government prevailing in court gives one an idea of the perceived
anticompetitive potential of the merger. The reliability of this measure is further
reduced by the fact that the underlying model is generated by the data from the
FTC but is being applied to the data from the Justice Department for a later period.
The above notwithstanding, COURT% is essentially a computable index of the
merger's relative potential harm. For example, a merger leading to a post-acquisition
HHI of 5000, with signi¯cant entry barriers and no hard evidence of collusive behavior,
has a .9838 probability of being enjoined; one with HHI = 2000, di±cult entry and
unlikely coordination among ¯rms | a .379 probability. Formally, we assume that
the same underlying case selection process generated the two samples, and that the
courts maintained their approach to prosecuting anticompetitive mergers throughout
the period spanned by both data sets.
44C Diagnostic Tests
In the full (\Econometric") model, error variance may not be constant since several
of the included variables { for example, WORK and CONGRESS { have the same
values for a range of observations. Also, it is possible that mergers involving large
¯rms (i.e., with large realizations of SALES) result in outcomes with systematically
larger errors. Therefore, a test for the presence of multiplicative heteroskedasticity is
in order.
Pagan and Vella (1989) suggest a series of moment-based tests, among them a
simple test for the restriction of homoskedasticity. Since the test can be carried
out without estimating the unrestricted model, its use is intuitively appealing. The
Lagrange Multiplier (LM) statistic for the null of constant variances is 14.467 and is
distributed, under the null hypothesis, as a chi-square with 12 degrees of freedom.
The critical value at the .05 level is 21.03, and at the .1 level it is 18.55, so the null
of homoskedastic variance cannot be rejected.
Another moment-based test can be carried out to determine whether the residuals
in the tobit model are normally distributed. The test, also originally suggested by
Pagan and Vella (1989) is adopted for censoring in both tails. The residuals from tobit
estimation are di®erences between predicted and actual values of D, where prediction
is given by












































In (2), ©() is the standard normal distribution and Á() is the corresponding density.
The test statistic is based on the distribution of the residuals' third and fourth
45moments. For the normal distribution without censoring, these are
E[²




However, if D = 0 or 1, then we can derive the moments of the truncated distribu-
tion from the following recursion provided by Pagan and Vella (1989) and modi¯ed
appropriately for the case of censoring in both tails:
Let Ei = E
£
²
ijD = 0 or D = 1
¤
Then Ei = (i ¡ 1)¾
2Ei¡2 ¡ ¾¸(¡¯
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The observed value of the LM statistic is 118.29, which is highly signi¯cant at any
reasonable level of con¯dence | the critical value of a chi-square with two degrees of
freedom is only 5.99 at .05 level. Thus, the null of normality is ¯rmly rejected.
While this test indicates that the assumption of normality may not be appropriate,
the recent econometric literature has little to say about what to do next. Intuitively,
one could assume a di®erent distribution (for instance, lognormal, exponential or
Weibull) and test the obtained residuals again. However, no particular choice of
distribution is justi¯ed a priori; moreover, assuming a distribution other than normal
may in fact make matters worse (Greene 2000, p. 916).
An alternative solution is to use a least absolute deviations estimator (LAD),
which has been shown to be robust to changes in distribution. But the cost may
be substantial in terms of precision, as the LAD estimator is not e±cient. In other
words, in applications where prediction is of interest, as it is here, this loss in ef-
¯ciency is not desirable. Moreover, Greene (1999) shows that the marginal e®ects
46computation used above continues to be valid even if the disturbances are not nor-
mally distributed. That is, the marginal e®ect of each explanatory variable equals the
estimated coe±cient times the probability of nonlimit observations, and this result
holds generally for any continuous distribution.
One can also examine the plot of the residuals from the tobit model to see whether
any obvious pattern, such as an upward or a downward trend is present. These
residuals are plotted in Figure 1; since no discernible pattern is evident, the normality
assumption is retained.
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47D Marginal Impact Computation for COURT%
To calculate the change in the dependent variable induced by a one-standard-deviation
change in COURT%, write the relevant part of the index function as
E[Djxi] = Ã1 ¹ X + Ã2 ¹ X
2
where ¹ X is the mean of the variable of interest (in this case, COURT%), and Ãi =
^ ¯i £ Prob(0 < D < 1) is the marginal impact. What is the e®ect on the LHS of a
one-¾x change in X?
E[Djxi; ¾x] = Ã1( ¹ X + ¾x) + Ã2( ¹ X + ¾x)
2








E[¢Djxi; ¾x] = Ã1¾x + Ã2(2¾x ¹ X + ¾
2
x);
where Ã1 = ¡1:4948, Ã2 = 1:4406, ¹ X = 0:782, and ¾x = ¡0:354.
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